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AMERICAN INVESTMENTS IN CHINA 
I. A NOTE OF EXPLANATION 
The title of this paper promises more than I have it in my power to fulfil. 
It has seemed best, therefore, to begin with a brief explanatory statement. 
An investigation of the international financial and economic relations of 
China is now being carried on. It will extend over a number of years, in-
cludes a visit to China on my part, and is planned to cover the whole of a 
wide and difficult subject. 
In the work of this investigation it has fallen to me to deal with American 
investments in China. After a brief survey of the situation the conclusion 
was forced upon me that I would be obliged to undertake a new and inde-
pendent study. A considerable amount of work has been done on this new 
study, but it is impossible to say whether it will be successfully completed, 
since its success depends, in large measure, upon its inclusiveness. In any 
case it is impossible to present any of the results at the present time. 
In addition to undertaking the preliminary work for a new estimate of 
American investments in China I have tried to bring together every estimate 
that has been made by others. The number of these estimates is small, but 
some of them are for recent years, and the task of finding them has resulted in 
the collection of a large number of partial estimates. 
In the following pages I present an account of American investments in 
China, based upon all of the information available. I have made use of the 
results of the investigation now in progress and I have not hesitated to make 
a guess or two when it seemed reasonable to do so in the light of these 
results. 
The members of the Conference are asked to bear in mind this statement 
and to regard my paper as the best summary I can make of the results of my 
work so far. I hope I am correct in saying that it presents as much informa-
tion on American investments in China as is possible in the present state of 
our knowledge of the subject. 
The general comments with which this paper begins are set down in the 
hope that they will promote discussion and that the results will reach me in 
wr~ting .. It is highly important that those who are working on the study of 
Chma'.s. 1~ternational financial and economic relations be given the benefit of 
the cnt1c1sm of such a gathering as the present conference of the Institute 
o.f Pacific Relations. My own opinion is that the study of China's interna-
!!Onal economic relations will prove to be the best approach to an understand-
~ng ?f present-day China. This opinion and the generalizations based upon 
tt will, no doubt, be challenged. 
The subject of foreign investments in the Pacific was dealt with at the 
1927 ~onference ~f the Institute of Pacific Relations and special attention 
was _given to fore1gn investments in China. "The chief result of these dis-
~Slons,:' we are told, "was the realization of the almost complete lack of 
tn onnat10n concerning the extent, nature, conditions, and effect of the in-
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vestments actually in existence at the present .time."~ To secure t~is in-
formation will be a long task and it may be an Impos~Ible one .. It will ~o~­
tinue to require the cooperation of the Institute of Pact.fic RelatiOns an~ It IS 
hoped that this cooperation will be given as generously 111 the future as It has 
been during the past year. 
II. CERTAIN GENERAL COMMENTS 
Foreign investment in China presents a whole array of problems o~ a 
theoretical, historical and practical sort. They range from narrow tec~mcal 
questions in the field of the exchanges to the broadest of problems m the 
field of international relations and the relations between different civilizations 
and cultures. A number of these problems have been selected for brief com-
ment. Something in the way of background is thus provided, against which 
to view the information about American investments which is presented 
later. 
The economist is likely to view foreign investment as a movement of 
capital from one country to another and to give first attention to the mechan-
ism by which this movement is brought about and to the reasons for the move-
ment. He undertakes to answer two questions; namely, why capital move-
ments take place and how they are brought about. 
To the second of these questions-that involving the mechanism of in-
ternational capital movements-a great amount of attention has been given 
in the discussions of European economic problems since the war. In these 
discussions it is called the transfer problem. I recognize that the subject is 
controversial and difficult. Nevertheless, I believe it possible to state the solu-
tion of the problem in general terms to which few economists would take ex-
ception. A capital movement from one country to another involves both the 
export and the import of capital. Confusion and complication will be avoided 
if we take the viewpoint of one of these countries. Since we have to do with 
China, we may as well select the capital importing country as appropriate to 
the occasion. 
The import of capital into China involves shifts in China's international 
balances of payment and such shifts are ordinarily accompanied and induced 
by appropriate shifts in rates of foreign exchange. The transfer to China 
ought to mean a fall in the price of foreign money in terms of Chinese 
money and, probably, an increase in China's excess of imports. 
China is on a silver standard for purposes of international transactions, 
and she has been on a silver standard throughout the period of modern 
foreign trade and foreign investment. The problem presents itself in this 
form : Can we find any trace of the mechanism of international capital move-
ments in Chinese silver exchange? There is also the somewhat more general 
question: What has been the consequence of China's silver standard in the 
field of capital movements? 
1 Problems of the Pacific: Chicago, 1928, p. 139. 
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It is improbable that capital movements to China have ever been sufficient-
ly large even for a short period, to create the hope that this effect upon the 
Chinese' exchange would repay detailed study. The obligations of the Chinese 
Government from the Chinese-Japanese war to the present time have, in fact, 
been such as to call for transfers out of China and not into China. Neither 
the borrowings to pay the Japanese indemnity nor the obligations repre-
sented. by the Boxer Indemnity involved remittances to China. The remit-
tances called for have been the other way. Business investments in China 
have been much neglected in discussions of these matters, but it is fairly 
certain that no remittances to China on capital account have ever been made 
in such amounts as to far outweigh the remittances from China and so pro-
vide an opportunity to verify the theory which the economist applies to the 
exchanges of a capital importing country. 
Among the consequences of China's silver standard in international trans-
actions, under the conditions which have obtained since the seventies of the 
last century, is probably some check upon investment in China by persons 
in countries whose currency is based upon the gold standard. The Chinese 
Government has been obliged to borrow in terms of gold currencies and the 
Boxer Indemnity was made an obligation in "gold." This fact creates the 
presumption that investments in China of other sorts have been less than they 
would have been had China been upon a gold or gold-exchange standard. 
One of the conclusions of the Japanese Coinage Investigation Commission 
which reported in 1896 upon the effects of the silver standard in Japan was 
that there had been "a reduction in the investment of capital made in Japan 
from gold countries."2 The Mexican Monetary Commission of 1903 was of 
the opinion that the silver standard was making it increasingly difficult for 
capitalists in gold-standard countries to invest in their country.8 The difficul-
ties of India under silver were in part due to the changes in sterling which 
the Indian Government had to meet and these changes were due to some 
extent to borrowings abroad. The Commission on International Exchange in 
its report on China in 1903 expressed the opinion that both Japan and Russia 
had found "the adoption of a stable exchange" a stimulus to investments by 
foreigners within these countries. The Commission was firmly of the opinion 
that similar results would follow in China and used this as one of the argu-
ments for foreign interest in Chinese monetary reform. 4 
Foreign investment in China is subject to so many varied influences that 
no one can say how far the adoption of the gold standard would have in-
fl~enced investment in the past or may influence it in the future, but it is 
fatrly certain that the gold standard would serve as a stimulus. 
: ~atsukaka, Report on the Adoption of lite Gold Standard in Japan : Tokio, 1899, pp. 162· 163, 
• Kem~_erer, Modern Currency Reforms : New York, 1916, pp. 484·7. 
Stab•hty of International Exchange: 58th Cong., 2nd Sess., House Doc. 144, pp. 14, 15. 
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A different aspect of foreign investments may be introduced by directing 
attention to the importance of capital movements in the relations between 
developed and undeveloped countries. The attention which has been given 
in recent years to the financial state of Europe and to the borrowings of 
Germany and other European countries in the United States has tended to 
obscure an outstanding characteristic of pre-war investments. Capital in-
vestments before the war were in large measure from developed to un-
developed countries and for purposes of economic development. Of course 
there are exceptions to this. Loans to the Russian and certain Balkan govern-
ments will occur to the reader at once. But loans for political and strategic 
reasons have seldom been of first importance. For example, it is probable 
that Great Britain in 1914 held about half of the world's international obliga-
tions and Sir George Paish estimated shortly before 1914 that, taking all the 
facts into account and considering the application of government borrowings, 
over sixty per cent of British foreign investments had been employed in the 
construction of railways. 5 Other facts might be cited, but it is no doubt a 
matter of common observation that capital has moved from developed to un-
developed countries, and that it has been employed chiefly in the introduction 
of modern transportation facilities and modern industrial equipment. 
Thi · is quite consistent with the answer of the economist to the question : 
Why does capital movement take place? The economist reasons that capital 
moves from countries where the rate of interest is low to countries where it 
is higher. Differences in the return on capital give him his first answer to 
the question. The next step in his reasoning involves greater abstraction and, 
as is usual in such cases, less general assent. He offers as his explanation 
of the differences in rates of interest from country to country the fact that 
additional capital available in an undeveloped country will be put to more 
"productive" uses than additional capital available in a developed country. In 
a world in which capital movements are, as a matter of fact, associated with 
some reasonable interpretation of the word "productive," the economist's ex-
planation will be accepted. It is an obvious fact that advances have been 
made in international transactions which cannot be regarded as productive. 
Moreover, in a particular case, or for a particular country, such advances 
may be of outstanding importance. In general, however, the facts justify the 
accepted reasoning, and the application of this reasoning to the case of China 
will now be undertaken. 
No one who is acquainted with economic conditions in China will ques-
tion the fact that the rate of interest is high there; that capital equipment is 
relatively scarce; and that foreign investment has been instrumental in bring-
ing it into the country. This may seem a trite and obvious statement, but it 
is worth while to remember, when one is considering the high finance and 
higher politics of certain loan negotiations, that the movement of capital to 
China is an economic problem. 
• Jountal of the Royal Stat. Soc., June, 1911, vol. 74, p. 185. 
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Viewed thus, the con~equence of a free moveme_nt of c~pital ~1ust_ be such 
· d stria! changes in Chma as to make her economtc and mdustnal hfe more 
mu W E F · · · like that of the Unit~d States ~nd . estern u~ope .. oretgn mvestment, . 111 
ther words, is bringmg and wtll bnng changes 111 Chma such as we descnbe ~y the phrase, "the !ndustrial Revolut!on." This mean~ that more and m~re 
capital equipment wtll gradually come 111to use; that a htgher standard of hv-
ing is to be expected; and that other consequences to which I give attention 
below are to be looked for. 
Since the modern international relations of China began with foreign 
trade, one may say truthfully that the changes which are taking place in 
China are the cumulative consequence of her foreign trade. One may trace 
the succession of events. Foreign trade brought the steamship to China and 
it was soon put to use in the rivers and canals of the country. The steamer 
has been followed by the railway and the cotton mill, and these in turn have 
led to borrowing by the Chinese Government and the great increase of in-
vestment by foreign business men. These consequences have come slowly, 
but it is certain that they have come to stay. 
They have come to stay because there has been an importation of ideas 
into China along with the goods and capital of the foreigner. One might 
indulge in speculation upon a question of this sort: When once a group of 
Chinese clearly understood the construction and operation of the steam en-
gine, was it not certain that the industrial revolution and its many consequences 
would follow? It is well to bear in mind when capital movements are under 
consideration that ideas have a power of penetration which is to some extent 
independent of steamer and bank. Foreign investment in China is no doubt 
having a profound effect upon the rate at which China is becoming indus-
trialized, but it is a fact that China would be moving toward industrialization, 
however slowly, if others had not a cent to lend her. 
When one has, by a feat of the imagination, seen capital movement as a 
part of a long process which began with modern foreign trade and which 
will make China, so far as we can see, more like the nations of Western 
Europe and America, one is prepared to take the next step and to attempt 
an explanation of the rate at which change is taking place. In terms of capital 
movement, this means a study of the checks and hindrances to the free move-
ment of capital to China. 
. The checks and hindrances upon the side of supply may well be con-
stdered first. It may be that the available capital will be insufficient to sup-
port an economic development in China upon a great and extended scale. I 
do not _believe this to be the case. The general conditions determining the 
rat~ of mterest seem to me such as to make it probable that saving and accumu-
latto~, that is, the provision of funds, is more flexible and more easily ex-
panstble than is the demand for such funds. 6 The great potential supply of 
movable funds may well have its place in the explanation of the eagerness 
- 1 See the discussion of this matter in Taussig, Pri11ciples of Ecot~omics : vol. II, p. 17; pp. 32-33. 
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which the foreigner has displayed at times in the making of loans in China. 
It is usual to explain this eagerness on grounds of international political 
rivalry and this explanation is no doubt of first importance, but there is a 
possibility that an economic factor plays a part. 7 It is possible, in other 
words, that the available capital may be a stimulus to, rather than a check 
upon, foreign investment in China. 
The important checks are rather upon the side of the demand for loan-
able funds. I realize that this will seem a strange doctrine to those who are 
familiar with the eagerness for funds of the military leaders of the immedi-
ate past, but it is true, nevertheless. It must be remembered that we have 
here under consideration not funds for an impecunious general or for a weak 
and unpopular government, but such funds as are for economic development, 
for railways, bridges, and mills. The effective demand for economic develop-
ment is limited and is in turn the chief limitation upon the movement of 
capital to China. 
This is not true of China alone, but is true in general of undeveloped 
countries. It may be put in a convenient phrase by calling it the principle of 
capacity to receive. It is in general the capacity of undeveloped countries to 
receive capita] which checks its movement and not the potential supply. This 
capacity to receive, in China's case, depends upon the social, the economic, 
and the political organization of the Chinese people and upon the available 
natural resources of the country. 
The inadequacy of China's natural resources has recently been set forth 
as an ultimate limitation upon the economic and industrial development of the 
country. It would, of course, follow that capital movement would be sub-
jected to the same limitation.8 The available natural resources of China are 
not known. It was the fashion some years ago to picture China as a country 
with limitless supplies of coal and with other resources in great abundance. 
Recent work upon the geology of China has brought about a reaction and it 
has become the fashion to look upon China as having the natural resources 
for only modest industrial development. I do not think the last word has been 
said upon this subject, and we must await the results of further study. And 
there is always the possibility that modern industry will be so altered by the 
progress of invention as to require natural resources somewhat different from 
those which it has required in the past. 9 
The limitations upon capital movement which lie in the social organiza-
tion and traditions of the Chinese people open up a subject which must be 
dealt with at greater length. China has offered to foreign trade, to foreign 
ideas, and to foreign capital what may be called passive resistance.to This 
1 Tht was pointed out with special a}>plicati on to th e Chinese case by C. A . Conant in his Th1 
United S tates in tire Orie"t : Boston, 1900. 
1 See Bain, Ores a" d Industry in the Far East: New York, 1927. 
111 This point has been made by Condliffe in an address on "Industrial Development in the Far 
East," published in the Chinese S ocial and Political Science Rev.: July, 1928, vol. XII, no. 3. 
10 Thi s is set fo rth at greater length in my Foreign Trade of Chi,.a: Sha nghai, 1926. See the 
concluding chapter. 
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passive resistance seems to me to flow f~om th~ ~~ry .nat~re of Chinese cu~­
ture. By this I do not mean that Chmese ctvthzatwn ts by nature anti-
foreign; what I d? mean i.s that Chine.s~ civilizatio~, being what. it is, has the 
property of resistmg foretgn commodtttes and capttal. As foretgn trade and 
foreign economic relations have grown, they have, in turn, exercised an 
effect upon Chinese social organization. But this is a broad subject which 
must be dealt with independently. 
The social, economic and political organization of China as it was in the 
past may well be called traditional China.11 The changes which began with 
the modern foreign trade of China, and which have brought about foreign 
investment and the development of modern industry and modern means of 
communication in China, are exerting a profound and, I bdieve, a disin-
tegrating effect upon traditional China. The disintegration of traditional 
China is probably the result of other factors as well, but it is my opinion 
that the international economic relations of China constitute the factor of 
greatest importance. 
Traditional China, if we are to believe both Chinese and Western students 
of history, had not changed for centuries. No radical transformation in 
China, comparable to the decline of feudalism in the West and the rise of 
national states, took place in China from the reign of Shih Huang Ti of the 
Ts'in Dynasty to recent times. We are told that the political principles and 
the ethical and economic thought of the Chinese are still more ancient and 
come down to us from the great philosophers of the Chow Dynasty. What is 
more, we find that Confucius represents himself as no innovator, but as the 
codifier and transmitter of thought which was old in his time. And we are 
led back to the days of Yao and Shun to find the origins of the traditions 
which may be said to have held universal sway over the Chinese people only 
yesterday. One rebels at this and formulates objections, but one is obliged 
to recognize the antiquity and the continuity of the Chinese political and social 
system. 
It is difficult to put the essential features of traditional China into a brief 
general statement, but it must be attempted if the disintegrating effect of 
modern economic relations with the outside world is to be appreciated. 
The outstanding characteristic of traditional China is the importance of 
the family. Closely associated with this is the importance of agriculture. 
Traditional China is an apparently endless series of agricultural villages in 
which the life of the people centers in the family. The family is, of course, 
the clan family or the great family and not the family as it has come to be 
in the West since the Industrial Revolution. It has been estimated that four-
fifths of the Chinese people live in such agricultural villages.l2 To under-
t
. u Here I follow the example of T'ang Leang·li. See the title of Chapter VI of his Tloe Founda-
•ons of Modern China: London , 1928. 
"J. B. Tayler, Farm and Factory in Cltina: London, 1928, p. 19. Professor Tayler's first chap-
ter presents a sympathetic picture of the agricultural village. 
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stand the life of these farm villages is to have a keen appreciation of tradi-
tional China. There is further reason for giving attention to the farm village. 
Changes in the economic state of Chinese agriculture will no doubt be in-
disputable evidence that the general consequences of the Industrial Revolu-
tion are appearing. If a rise in the standard of living is to come about in 
China, it must reach the farm village before it can be said to have gone 
very far. It is not probable that much evidence can be found of changes in 
the standard of living of the Chinese farmer .13 
In the small cities of China there are to be found the landed gentry, minor 
officials and the handicraft workers. Cottage industry, to which Lieu gives a 
separate place, 14 was, I believe, of little relative importance in traditional 
China. A few great cities are to be found that are commercial centers and 
still fewer that are industrial centers. In these live the higher officials, the 
merchants, bankers and the wealthier landed gentry. The commercial and in-
dustrial life of the cities was dominated by the guild. The power of the 
family was less complete than in the country; it did not cover so wide a field 
but it was, nevertheless, the outstanding fact in the social organization. 
Throughout traditional China the customs and traditions associated with the 
family and with the guild controlled the Chinese people in their daily affairs. 
The political organization of the China of the past may be briefly described 
as a bureaucracy placed over family and guild. Above the officials was the 
emperor and his court. If one were to follow the custom of the German 
writers and give the political organization of China a name, I suppose it 
might be called a mandarinate.1 5 
The characteristic feature of the mandarinate was the government by 
emperor and officials of a vast number of self-governing families and guilds. 
To resolve the inconsistency in the governing of self-governing families, one 
must understand the nature of government in traditional China. The first 
element is the Confucian doctrine of Exemplary Kingship. "The thing that 
impresses the reader of the classics, as an outstanding feature of Chinese 
political thought, if indeed it is not the outstanding characteristic, is the con-
stant emphasis upon the need and efficacy of personal morality in governing 
subjects. Mencius put the matter pithily when he said that it would be as 
foolish for a man to rule without practicing morality as it would be to climb 
trees in order to catch fish. 16 Good government was the exhibition of virtue 
13 Japan is a more highly industrialized country than China and yet it is said of the country 
people of Japan that "they remai n chained to the areas, methods, crops, income, and opportunities of 
medieval A sia while the possibilities of life in the modern world are in plain view, just beyond their 
reach.'' Buchanan, D. H., "The Rural Economy of Japan," in the Q1.tarterly Journal of Bco11.01nics: 
August, 1923, vol. 37, p. 571. 
14 Lieu, D. K., China's I nd11strics and Finattce: Peking, 1927, pp. 1, 9·12. 
lfS Wittfogel. "Probleme der Chinesischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte," in Archiv f'U.r So:Jialwissen· 
schaft ~tnd Sozialpolitik: April, 1927, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 334·5, calls it a Beamtcnstaat or a Ba~tern 
und J:Jeamtenstaat. 
"Pott, W . S. A., Chinese Political Philosophy: New York, 1925, p. 69. 
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so moving as to win the loyalty of the subject and to command reverence. 
The West is familiar with the proposition that the end of government is the 
good life; in the Chinese classics it is regarded as the means of government, 
as well. One must recognize that this is presented as an ideal, but it serves 
to bring out the point of view toward government to which traditional China 
gave assent. 
Another characteristic grew out of the fact that the payment of tribute 
has been, throughout the East, evidence of political loyalty. This must be 
understood in connection with the fact that aliens have frequently occupied 
the throne of China. The payment of taxes in China has behind it this back-
ground. It follows that an important duty of the mandarin was the collection 
of taxes. 
China of the past has been described by Ku Hung-ming as a constitu-
tional monarchy without representation,17 and the characterization is useful 
if one remembers that the constitution lies in the customs and traditions of 
family and guild. This constitution, if it may be so called, by its nature 
brought it about that traditional China did not have and could not have a 
central government of the sort that Europe has had since the rise of national 
states and the Industrial Revolution. The Emperor of China held sway over 
the families of his people. The officials were his ministers and the payment 
of taxes was the evidence that he had a loyal and obedient people. 
Much has been made of the right to rebel, which may be regarded as a 
sort of representation. The mandate of Heaven was held to be withdrawn 
from an emperor whose rule had offended against the customs and traditions 
of family and guild, and whose offence was accompanied by plain evidence 
that the welfare of his people was being destroyed. 
Traditional China, of which I have given a very inadequate picture, 
could not and cannot continue to exist in the face of the changes which 
began with modern foreign trade and which are now associated with 
foreign investment and industrial development. Traditional China might 
have adapted itself to modern diplomatic and political relations, if we can 
think of these as separate, but traditional China could not adapt itself to 
the modern economic world. It is this thesis which I offer as the reason 
for my attempt to cover so broad a field. 
~rly foreign trade and the foreign relations which grew out of the 
foreign trade after the British East India Company lost its monopoly 
brought foreign demands for equality of treatment. These demands were 
hardly understandable in a political organization that applied guild rules to 
trade and regarded the emperor as the Son of Heaven. This was followed 
by the demand that treaties must be regarded as binding contracts even 
though they were contrary to custom and tradition. This view ran counter 
to the "constitution" of the Empire, as the word is used above. So much 
"Quoted in Erkes, Ed., China : Gotha, 1919, p. 103. 
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has been pointed out by more than one writer.18 Professor Steiger main-
tains that "the political and economic theories of the West had, for the 
Chinese state, disruptive possibilities equal to those which the modern indus-
trialized nations of Europe and America see in the doctrines of Bolshevism." 
The problems raised by the early trade soon became political problems 
and the whole question might, it seems to me, have been dealt with largely 
in the political sphere if foreign trade had not brought certain consequences 
in the economic field. 
It brought, in the first place, steamers, railways, factories and modern 
mining, the ideas and equipment which go with modern industry. Modern 
transportation facilities and modern industrial equipment are bringing ter-
ritorial divison of labor into a community of economically independent agri-
cultural villages. These changes necessitate economic and political organ-
ization on a national scale. Such organization is incompatible with the 
maintenance of traditional China. 
Modern industrial equipment has come, in part, as the result of the direct 
investments of foreign business men and this has brought problems to which 
I shall refer presently. In part it has come through loans to the Chinese 
Government. Foreign loans have brought the necessity for a new view of 
taxation. If a government is to borrow for railway development, operate 
railways, and collect taxes to meet its foreign obligations, it cannot succeed 
so long as its people regard taxation as they did when it was the gathering 
of tribute for the imperial court. 
China must have an integrated economic and political system covering 
the whole country if she is to meet the problems of modern industry and 
the import of capital. An integrated economic and political system on a 
national scale is inconsistent with essential features of traditional China. 
There is no more interesting and no more practical study than that of the 
theories and policies by which China resolves this dilemma, for these 
theories and policies will form an important part of the very foundation of 
modern China. 
I am tempted, before turning to the last of my general comments on 
foreign investments, to make an application of my generalizations to the 
present political difficulties of China. In the past, revolution in China has 
meant resistance to the demands of the emperor and his officials. To rise 
against the imperial government was the people's protection and so long as 
the Manchus were in power there was the added satisfaction of resisting a 
dynasty which was not Chinese. Today the necessary revolution is the 
creation of a central government of a sort which has not existed in the past. 
When a unified railway system is in existence, or a central bank, free from 
the disruptive influences of traditional China, the significant Chinese revolu-
tion will have made progress. 
11 By no one more clearly than by Steiger in his Chitla and tile Occident : New Haven, 1927, pp. 
1, 10, 11. The quotation is from page 10. 
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My final comments concern foreign investments as an aspect of the rela-
tion between foreigners and Chinese within China. I have in mind the 
whole set of phenomena which the words extraterritoriality, treaty ports 
and treaty tariff bring to the mind of those who are familiar with the inter-
national relations of China. 
There is no need to point out how this system arose. The existence of 
foreign trade lies behind it. On the Chinese side it grew out of the attempt 
to deal with foreign traders by the guild method. The difference between 
the legal concepts and the judicial practices of traditional China and of the 
Western nations, their conflicting views as to adequate punishment for 
criminal acts, have been dealt with by a number of writers. I am interested 
rather in the economic aspects of this system and especially in its relation 
to foreign investment and the introduction into China of capital equipment 
and modern industrial methods. 
It has been pointed out above that the nature of Chinese social and 
economic organization was such as to offer passive resistance to foreign trade 
and foreign capital. The treaty port and extraterritoriality system over-
came, or pushed aside, this resistance in a few cities. From this have flowed 
certain consequences which are worth consideration. 
The position of the foreigner in China has brought it about that China's 
foreign relations have been concerned to a surprising degree with events 
taking place within China. One has but to turn to the diplomatic corre-
spondence between China and any one of the foreign powers to become 
convinced of this. On the economic side this means that problems of in-
creasing economic complexity have had to be dealt with by the methods of 
international diplomacy which were not designed to deal with them. This 
is true not only of matters of public interest such as the tariff, but of the 
rights of a foreign business corporation within China. As MacMurray has 
pointed out, "Matters which would elsewhere be of merely commercial 
character, susceptible of judicial determination in case of dispute, are in 
China matters of international political concern, for the settlement of which 
~he ultimate recourse is to diplomatic action."19 The ultimate problem here 
Is the reconciling of the theory of the complete political independence of 
states with the hard facts of economic interdependence. The abolition of 
extraterritoriality and the Chinese conventional tariff do not solve this ulti-
mate problem. We have only to observe the international economic prob-
lems of post-war Europe to become convinced that national independence 
does not solve international economic problems. 
A further consequence of the position of the foreigner in China is the 
fact that foreign investment in China has been in large measure direct in-
vestment by foreign corporations and business firms. The slowness of the 
-y ~•llfacl\{urray, J. V. A., Treaties and Agreements with or concerning C!oi11a, 1894·1919 : New 
or • 192!, vol. I, p. xv. 
16 AMERICAN INVESTMENTS 
Chinese to make effective use of the corporation and the nature of the 
Chinese government are minor factors of importance. The foreign invest-
ments of the world are in large part brought about by the purchase in one 
country of the corporate and government securities of another. So gener-
ally is this the case that estimates of foreign investments in Europe and 
America, as, for example, of American investments in Germany, fre-
quently disregard altogether the direct investments of business firms. Such 
direct investments are of considerable importance in every case,20 but in a 
study of foreign investment in China they are the first item to be considered. 
It may be remarked, also, that direct business investments offer the greatest 
difficulties to the investigator for reasons which are obvious. 
Direct foreign investment in China was limited before the signing of the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. By this treaty the Japanese and, by the 
operation of the most-favored-nation clause, foreigners in general secured 
the right to engage in manufacturing in the open ports of China. Since 
1895 certain of the treaty ports of China have become industrial centers of 
considerable importance and this has been, in no small measure, the result 
of direct investment by foreigners. It is not improbable that these direct 
foreign investments are twice as great as all other forms of foreign invest-
ment. he geographic distribution of modern industrial establishments in 
China, the early economic development of Shanghai, and the rapid develop-
ment of Manchuria are connected with the importance of direct investments 
of foreigners under the conditions which have prevailed in China. 
I leave it to the reader to supply his own comment on the responsibil-
ities that go with the important part which foreigners have had in the in-
troduction of modern industrial establishments into China. If the system 
of treaty ports and extraterritoriality is to continue it is necessary that at-
tention be given to the problems of labor and taxation which are involved. 
The relation of foreign loans to the government finance of China and to 
railway development has been more generally discussed than any other 
aspect of foreign investment, in spite of the fact that direct business invest-
ments are of greater quantitative importance. There are a number of rea-
sons for this. The mere fact that there has been more available informa-
tion about China's government loans than about business investments seems 
to explain it in part. A reason of greater importance is that loans to the 
Chinese government and especially loans for railway construction have 
played a conspicuous part in international rivalries in the Far East. These 
rivalries have been seized upon by newspapers and by popular writers. A 
whole romantic literature has grown up about these rivalries. They have 
played a part in two wars in the East and in the World War. They have 
given currency to such phrases as "economic imperialism," "peaceful pene-
tration," and "conquest by railway and bank," phrases which help to explain 
the suspicion with which the Chinese have come to regard foreign relations 
~ figure of $5,000 million is mentioned by Hall in "The Balance of International Payments 
?f the United States in 1928," Trade Information B"lletin No. 625: Department of Commerce, Wash· 
mgton, 1929, p. 44. 
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of every sort. Here we touch a wide problem, the relation of economic 
interests to war, and to the state of the public mind which makes wars prob-
able. The problem is not confined to China, the Far East, or any part of 
the world, but it may well be that a re-examination of the course of events 
in China will throw some light upon it. 
The position of the foreigner in China has developed from earlier trade 
relations. These trade relations have, in turn, brought investment and mod-
ern industrial establishments. Foreign investment in the securities of the 
Chinese government has been to a considerable extent for the financing of 
railways. The foreign communities in China are largely communities of 
business men. Economic interests. and economic considerations have played 
a major part in China's foreign relations. At the same time, it must be ad-
mitted that the direct economic effects of these relations seem to have been 
small and the effects in other fields to have been greater. This is very 
largely because the resistance offered by traditional China to foreign trade 
and foreign capital confined them to a few open ports. The whole of 
China's foreign trade is small, when the size and population of the country 
is taken into consideration. The whole foreign investment in China is by 
no means large. But the circumstances under which the trade and invest-
ment have grown up and are carried on have given foreign interests in 
China a political importance out of all proportion to the direct economic 
consequences attributable to them. 
No one can attempt to survey the economic consequences of China's 
foreign relations without coming to the conclusion that the strong feelings 
betrayed by the Chinese and the interested foreigners are to a considerable 
degree the result of the political and psychological aspects of the matter. 
From the point of view of the foreigner, extraterritoriality comes to be 
looked upon as a badge of superiority of the white, Anglo-Saxon or 
foreigner; from the viewpoint of the Chinese, it seems to carry with it 
the announcement to the world that the Chinese are not quite as good as 
other people. When the position of the foreigner in China is seen in these 
terms, a cool examination of the possibilities in the situation becomes impos-
sible. 
Without attempting to anticipate the results of a more complete ex.ami-
nat_ion of the economic consequences of the position of the foreigner in 
Chma, one may offer certain observations. If changes in the position of 
the f?reigner are to be made they ought not to be for the purpose of de-
creasi~g the flow of goods and capital. Whatever may be the political prob-
lems mvolved, there is good reason for supposing that the material welfare 
of China will be increased by the import of capital. And, it may be added, 
Pr?sperous countries have usually found it possible to secure from others 
fa1r consideration for their political difficulties. 
I have tried to present foreign investment in China by giving attention 
!0 four aspects: ( 1) The movement of capital to China presents problems 
111 the field of the exchanges and of trade balances. These problems are 
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problems of theory and its verification. (2) The movement of capital to 
China is an aspect of the relations between developed and undeveloped 
countries. (3) Foreign investment in China is a part of the change which 
means the disintegration of traditional China. ( 4) Foreign investment in 
China is an important aspect of the system of treaty ports and extraterri-
toriality which has growrt up in China. Its relation to Chinese government 
finance and to international rivalries in the Far East has been mentioned. 
It is obvious that too much has been said to serve merely as an introduc-
tion to the consideration of American investments in China. It is also ob-
vious that too little has been said to make this a finished essay upon foreign 
investment in China. I trust it will be accepted for what it is, a statement 
of my observations, written down in the midst of my work in the hope that 
it will bring criticism and comment from those who are interested in a sub-
ject which will grow more important in Pacific relations with every passing 
year. 
III. AMSRICAN INVES'l'MEN'l'S IN CHINA 
The following account of, American investments in China is based upon 
every known estimate of such investments. These estimates are few in 
number, as will appear, but, fortunately, several of them are of recent date. 
The latest of them was undertaken by the Department of State of the 
United States Government within the last two years. A new investigation of 
American investments in China is now in progress, but its success is still in 
doubt, since it depends upon wide cooperation. It has not been possible to 
make direct use of the available results of the new investigation, and none 
of the earlier estimates cover the whole field. I have, therefore, combined 
totals. and supplemented with information obtained from other sources, 
where I could, in order to make this account as complete as possible. 
Certain conclusions are to be found in the closing paragraphs. These 
are, of course, tentative and it is possible that my final conclusions will be 
somewhat different. I have tried to provide the informed reader with suf-
ficient information to enable him to come to his own conclusions as to which 
of my generalizations are likely to be modified. 
The investments are presented under three divisions. These divisions 
have been found useful for both historical and analytical purposes and in 
the plans for the investigation now being carried on. Each of the divisions 
requires a word or two of explanation. 
The first division is Business Investments. This covers all direct in-
vestments in China by American business men and corporations. The im-
portance of such investments is a characteristic of the Chinese situation. 
They are connected with the existence of treaty ports, extraterritoriality, 
and the position of the foreigner in China. 
American holdings of Chinese securities and the obligations of the 
Chinese Government form the second division. This includes such issues 
of Chinese securities as may have been made in the United States and pur-
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chases by Americans of Chinese securities issued in other countries. It in-
cludes also advances to the Chinese Government and the sale of supplies to 
the Government and to Government institutions. It is plain that no sharp 
line can be drawn between certain of these obligations of government insti-
tutions for supplies and business investments, since the debts are usually 
due to American firms in China. The usual practice has been to include 
such debts under this second heading, rather than under the first. 
The third division includes the property in China of American mission 
and philanthropic societies. There are, in addition, certain educational and 
scientific institutions. It may be questioned whether such property repre-
sents investment at all. There is no expectation of a monetary return on 
the part of its owners, nor is there usually any expectation that the funds 
so placed will ever be withdrawn from China. There is thus a sharp differ-
ence between mission and business investments which has at times been 
blurred by careless writers. At the same time, the purchase of land and 
the erection and equipment of buildings in China for mission purposes re-
quires that remittances be made to China. Such remittances play the same 
part in the mechanism of capital movement and in China's balance of pay-
ments as remittances for business investment or advances to the Chinese 
Government. 21 Remittances to China for land, buildings, and equipment 
must be dealt with as investments for certain purposes, even if, in the long 
run, they prove to be gifts to the Chinese people and not investments at all. 
There is an additional reason for observing the matters dealt with in this 
division. The value of the property of mission and philanthropic societies 
is an index of general American interest in China which may not be neg-
lected without running the risk of presenting a false picture. 
I propose to examine the nature and extent of American investments in 
China over certain brief periods, or at certain years. For the first of these 
periods I turn to Canton shortly before the signing of the Treaty of Nan-
king and the opening of the five ports. 
The trade of those days was small and was largely in the hands of the 
British. Morse states that the average for the sixteen years ending in 1833 
was $48 million for the combined trade of Great Britian and the United 
States, of which the American share was about $8.5 million. 22 It is well 
known that the sum of $8.5 million is considerably greater than the actual 
~rade between the two countries, for it includes non-American goods brought 
111 American ships. 23 Throughout the early trade and, indeed, until the sev-
2h1 In study_ing the mechanism of capital movements all payments for which there is no qu·id pro 
quo ave ce:tatn common characteristics, which explains the apparent anomaly in the study of Ger-~an reparatiOns when the mechanism of capital movements is under consideration. The anomaly dis-
fppdarsd when we turn to capital investments as the result of differences in rates of return. Mission 
un s o not come to China because interest rates are high. 
22 Morse, II. B., ltzternational Relations of the Chinese Empire: vol. 1, pp. 89-92. 
Tr d%1 Statistics from American sources are brought together in a convenient table in Pan, S.L., Tla.c 
0 e of the U.S. with China: New York, 1924, p. 15. 
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enties, the importance of American shipping was an outstanding characteris-
tic of American participation in the trade of China. Morse gives the aver-
age number of American ships during the same sixteen years as 37 and of 
British ships as 56. American ships, however, represented an investment 
in the carrying trade of the world, and not an investment in China. 
Turning to Canton in the days of the factories, we find a census of 
foreigners and foreign firms for the year 1836 in the Chinese Repository.24 
According to this census the foreign population of Canton was 307 and the 
number of firms 55. Of the foreign population, 44 were American, and 
of the firms, 9, a percentage of 14 and 16 respectively. 
Among the nine American firms were Olyphant & Co., Russell & Co., 
and Wetmore & Co. Morse estimates that it required no less than about 
$250,000 a year to keep up these establishments.25 
The amount of actual property owned by Americans in Canton during 
these years is not easy to estimate. A young American, who was for a 
time a partner of Russell & Co. in Canton, wrote home to his mother late 
in 1835 giving her an account of a fire which threatened the factories. He 
had found it necessary to place the goods of his company on a boat for safe-
keeping. "We had," he says, "about $300,000 in our treasury and perhaps 
$50,000 worth of goods in the house."26 Another and later fire gives us 
additional information. During the events which led to the "Arrow" war, 
the Canton factories were completely destroyed in December, 1856. The 
claims of the American firms for damages are reprinted in an American 
Government document. 27 The largest claim allowed we find to have been 
that of Purdon & Co. for $111,000. Another firm was allowed $98,000. 
Russell & Co. submitted various statements which show the property of the 
firm to have been valued at about $100,000. The total amount paid by the 
Chinese Government was Tis. 500,000 ($735,239), of which a part was later 
returned to the Chinese Government. 28 The total included other losses than 
those by fire at Canton, but the information about individual firms gives us 
some idea of the value of the goods on hand. It is probable that the silver 
had been removed from the treasuries when the fire took place.29 
The amount of silver at any one time was large, especially before 1827. 
I have estimated elsewhere that 60% of the value of the goods brought to 
"'Jan., 1837, vol. 5, pp. 426-32. 
""Morse, Int. R ei.: vol. 1, p. 83. 
"Hughes, Sarah Forbes: L etters a"'l Recollections of John M<lrray Forbes: New York, 1899, 
PI>. _76-7. It is interesting that Forbes began his business career in the China trade and ended it as 
chat r an of the board of an American railroad in the Middle West. 
• . 
21 Message of the Preside"t . of the United States Relative to the Execution of the Treaty witlt 
Chona for the Settlement of Clatm s, 40th Congress, 3rd Session. Ex. Doc. No. 29, Washingon 1869. 
A summary statement of claims is to be found on pp. 158-161. ' 
28 Foster, J, W., American Diplotnacy i1' the Orient, p. 244. The sum paid over in 1885 amounted, 
with accrued interest, to $453,400. 
""This is Morse's opinion also. Int. R ei.: vol. I, p. 435. 
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China by the Americans from about 1800 to 1834 was in the form of silver. so 
This percentage was greatly reduced during the later years. It is not un-
reasonable to suppose that the large amount of silver held by Russell & Co. 
in 1835 was characteristic of American firms in general. 
The foreign firms of the factory days were not permitted to own either 
land or buildings31 but hired buildings from the Chinese hong merchants 
at moderate rates. Another factor in estimating investments is highly uncer-
tain, namely, the amount advanced by the hong merchants to the American 
firms. Dennett is of the opinion that this was large in the early days of the 
American trade. 3 2 It is probable that the Americans were trading on their 
own capital after the Napoleonic wars. 
Considering all the available information, it may be estimated that Amer-
ican investment in China at any one time during the late thirties, that is, dur-
ing the closing years of the period before the treaties, consisted of about 
half a million dollars in goods and about $2.5 million in silver; say, three 
million dollars altogether. 
An unconsidered aspect of these early investments is brought out in the 
correspondence of John Murray Forbes, who mentions the fact that after 
his return to the United States he had the management in his own country 
of "about half a million of my friend Houqua's money."33 This money was 
invested, we are told, in American stocks. This adds to the uncertainty of 
our estimates for this early period. The total of three million dollars of 
American investments in China is no more than a guess. 
The period of the seventies of the last century is to be considered next. 
By the seventies the Suez Canal had been opened; there was telegraphic 
communication between China and the West; steam shipping had become im-
portant; and Shanghai had become the chief port for foreign trade. Such 
imports into China as cotton yarn and kerosene oil began to increase and to 
give the trade the characteristics of a later time. This period marks the 
close of the American trade of earlier days. The great American firms 
and the New England ships declined in importance or disappeared alto-
gether. 
Certain figures will serve as a rough index of the importance of Amer-
ican interests in China. The total trade of China was about the same in 
value in 1871 and 1875, and of this total, Hk. Tis. 137 million, the American 
share was 7.70jo and 6.3 % for these years. The statistics of the United 
10 Remer, C. F., The F oreign T rade of China : Shanghai, 1926, p. 24. 
N . 
81 MacNair, H . F ., M odern Chinese History-Selected R eadings : Shangha i, 1923, p. 27. Mac-
atr has reprinted this from W. C. Hunter 's B its o f Old China. 
ltl Dennett, Tyler, Americans in Easter n. Asia : New York, 1922, p. 52 . 
., Hughes, Sarah Forbes, op. cit ., p. 101. Houqua was the wealthiest of the Chinese hong 
tnerchan ts. 
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States Government do not give figures for China, separate from Hongkong, 
until 1875 when the total trade was 15 million dollars; it did not reach 20 
million dollars until 1880.34 
The total number of foreign firms in China during the early seventies 
was about 350 and the foreign population about 3,500. In 1874 American 
firms formed 14.7% of the total, and in 1877 10.6%. The percentage which 
the American population formed of the total foreign population was 15.2% 
for 1874 and 10% in 1877.3 5 These percentages do not differ radically from 
those of the Canton days. In 1874 the American missionaries in China 
number 210, or about 40% of the American population,36 and comprised 
about the same percentage of the total number of Protestant missionaries 
in the country. 
American shipping in China gives us the most important single clue to 
the total American investment in the country. The total tonnage of the 
shipping that came under the view of the Chinese Maritime Customs was 
7.3 million tons in 1871 and 11.9 million tons in 1877. Of this total no 
less than 43% was American in 1871. A French officer of the Maritime 
customs said of the Americans, "it is impossible to compete with their 
steamers, except by opposing them by others of the same kind, built on the 
same model." Seven out of the nine steamers on the Yangtze were Amer-
ican in 1865. An American boat, the Suwonada, "bears the palm for the 
rapidity of her coast voyages."37 An American official writing ten years 
later explained the large American share in shipping as due to the superi-
ority of American models and "the enterprise and good fortune of a few 
of our citizens." He concludes his comment by questioning "whether this 
interest is not already on the wane."SB 
Such was the situation in the early seventies. In 1876 the American 
percentage had declined to 24 and in 1877 to 5. The explanation of the 
sudden drop from 2.5 million tons to half a million is the sale of the entire 
fleet of Ru sell & Co. to the recently formed China Merchants Steam 
Navigation Co.39 The fleet was owned by the Shanghai Steam Navigation Co. 
in which Russell & Co. held the chief interest. The sum received for the 
boats was Tls. 2 million, but in addition the Shanghai Steam Navigation 
Company retained its reserve fund so that they received Tls. 2.4 million.40 
At the rate of exchange of the time the sum is about $3 million in United 
" Statistics in taels a re from the repo rts of the Chinese Maritime Customs and those in dolJars 
from rhe Statistical Abstract of the United S tates. 
,. Figures from U. S. Government : Report upon the Commercial Relations of the U. S. 
1875, pp. 252-3; 1878, p. 238. 
88 U. S. Government, Commercial Relations, 1875, p. 253. 
81 
'reat Britain: Reports from the Foreig,t Comtm'ssioners at the Various Ports in Chi1ta for 
the year 1865: London, 1867, p. 137. 
"U. S. Gov't: Commercial Relations: 1876, p. 257. 
,. It happens that _the steamers of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company were sold to the Jap· 
anese Government dunng the same year. Chinese Maritime Customs: Reports on Trade, 1878, p." 99, 
•o U. S. Gov't: Foreign Relations, 1877, pp. 87, 90; Commerdal Relations, 1878, p. 212. 
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States currency, and we may accept this sum as a part of the American bus-
iness investments of the years immediately before the sale. 
Further information concerning American investments is limited to 
Shanghai. We are told in a document of 1856 that "property in houses 
and lands to the value of a million dollars is owned by Americans in Shang-
hai.41 It is probable that this includes both business and mission property. 
American property was largely in the part of Shanghai called Hongkew and 
the land alone in Hongkew is reported to have been valued at almost exactly 
Tis. 2 million in 1880.4 2 It is not unreasonable to suppose that American 
holdings were considerably greater by 1875; say, $2 million. 
We know also that in 1882 the land in the International Settlement at 
Shanghai and in the French Concession was valued by a local Chamber of 
Commerce at Tis. 24 million and the stocks of merchandise at Tis. 32 mil-
lion. 43 If we suppose that half of the American holdings of land and houses 
were for business purposes and that stocks of goods in the hands of Amer-
ican business men were equal in value to their houses and lands, we may add 
a sum of $1 million for such stocks and goods. There was at the time no 
sale of Chinese securities abroad and there had been in 1874 no loan to the 
Chinese Government of which we have record. 
The conclusion is that American investments in China, without at-
tempting to separate the property of missions, was around the year 1875, 
about as follows: Shipping, $3 million; land and buildings, $2 million; 
stocks of goods, $1 million. This makes a total of $6 million and is prob-
ably an underestimate. · 
I turn next to the years between the Sino-Japanese war and the Boxer 
Uprising; that is, to the years from 1895 to 1900. Railroad and industrial 
development was still in the future, but the trade had shown great progress 
since the seventies. Shanghai had grown in importance, and foreign inter-
ests in general were greater. Let us turn to the figures showing the share 
of the United States. 
For the year 1898 the Chinese Customs statistics show that China's total 
trade was Hk. Tis. 369 million, and that the direct trade with the United 
States was 6.27o of this, almost exactly the same percentage as for 1875. 
The year 1899 saw a great increase in trade and the American share was 
9.5%, a higher percentage than for any year since 1871. The American 
statistics show the trade to have been about $30 million for these years. 
Imports from the United States, it may be remarked, had increased rela-
tively to exports to the United States. 
The statistics of foreign population show that Americans formed about 
the same percentage of the foreign population as in the seventies and in the 
. '~U._ S. Gov't Dept. of State: Report on tlte Commercial Relations of tlte U. S. with all For-
etgn atto11s: 34th Cong., 1st Sess., Ex. Doc. No. 47. Washington, 1856, vol. I, p. 257. 
k u Chronicle and Directory for China, Japan, etc., for the Year 1899: The Daily Press Hong-ong, 1899, p. 138. ' 
41 Chronicle & Directory ... for tlte year 1899, p. 138. 
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thirties: 15.2 in 1898, 13.6 in 1899, and 11.3% in 1900. The number of 
firms had grown to 70 in 1899 and 81 in 1900, but there was a noticeable 
falling off in the percentage which American firms formed of the total. It 
was 5.5% in 1898, 7% in 1899, and 8% in 1900; in the seventies it had been 
from 10 to 15%. The presence of certain large American firms may help 
to account for this, but it is probable that the chief reason was that mission 
activities had grown more rapidly since the seventies than business activities. 
My own figures show that the number of American mission societies repre-
sented in China increased from 15 to 31 between 1875 and 1900. The num-
ber of American missionaries in 1899 was about a thousand. 44 
American shipping in Chinese waters continued to decline from the low 
point it had reached in 1875 and it was at no time greater than 1% of the 
total shipping in the trade. The years 1884 and 1885 are an exception. 
Russell & Co. held the fleet of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Co. 
for a brief period while China was at war with France.45 
We have at best but scattered and incomplete information about Amer-
ican business investments in China. We know that the 70 or 80 American 
firms included some of great importance. The Standard Oil Company, for 
example, must have had a considerable investment. Kerosene oil had grown 
in in.portance as an import and in 1898 about 100 million gallons were 
brought in, one-half coming from the United States. Among the other 
firms of importance were the American Trading Co. and Fearon, Daniel 
& Co. 46 Each of these two firms formed a company to build and operate a 
cotton mill in Shanghai. The two mills were in operation in 1899, but by 
the end of 1901 one of them had failed. 47 We do not know how much 
Chinese and British capital was supplied for these ventures. The total 
capital for the two was probably about 2 million Shanghai taels. 
We have an estimate which puts the total land value in Shanghai at 
about SO million taels for 1899 and the stocks of goods at 60 million taels. 
We know also that the funded debt of the Shanghai municipality was about 
Tis. 1 million and that most of this was held in Shanghai. There were 
in the Settlement about 360 Americans out of a total population of 5,000 
foreigners. 
The number of open ports in China was 29 at the end of 1898, and we 
may suppose that the continued increase in the number of these ports called 
for additional American investment:• One is tempted to say that the total 
American business investment was more than double that of 1875, but it is 
perhaps best not to set down any figure. 
"The Christian Ocmpation of China (Shanghai, 1922, p. 346) gives the number of American 
Protestant missionaries in China as 513 in 1889 and 1,304 in 1905. The M issionary Review of the 
World (February, 1899, vol. 12, no. 2, p. 93) gives 967 as the number of foreign workers in China 
under American societies . 
.. Dennett, Tyler (Americans in Eastern Asia, p. 586) notes this fact and deals with certain 
general aspects of the decline of American shipping. 
•• Said by Lord Charles Beresford (in The B reak ·111> of China, New York, 1899, p. 94) to have 
been "half English." 
. ., Chinese Mariti!"e Customs: Ret1<rns of Trade & Trade Reports: 1898, p. 245, 1901, p. 289; 
Dorectory and Cllron<ele .. . : 1899, p. 147; 1905, p. 2 15. 
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American holdings of Chinese securities and of the obligations of the 
Chinese government probably amounted to little. If there were any such 
holdings they were the result of purchases abroad of bonds which were 
issued in connection with the three large loans to meet the Japanese indem-
nity. 
The period from 1895 to 1900 was one of fevered, if somewhat ineffec-
tual, activity in the promotion of railway schemes in China. These schemes 
must be seen in the light of the political rivalries of the time. Railroad loan 
agreements, non-alienation agreements, the leasing of ports to foreign pow-
ers were the guns fired in the "battle of the concessions." John Hay's 
reassertion of the open-door policy was called forth by the danger of the 
partition of China among the powers. It is an interesting fact, and one 
which throws light upon the subject of immediate interest, that Hay seems 
to have trade in mind and not investments. Dennett is of the opinion that 
"there was not enough American money seeking investment to make it 
worth while to quarrel about the preferential rights to construct railways 
or operate mines which had already been given to other powers."48 The 
importance of investment in connection with the Open Door became clearer 
through the years that followed and much study was given to such a formu-
lation of the policy at the Washington Conference as would cover the 
movements of capital, as well as those of goods. 
In 1900 the Americans had one important railway loan contract which 
they were to lose, that for the construction of the Canton-Hankow Railway. 
They had had earlier opportunities but these had come to nothing. The 
Canton-Hankow agreement in its original form was signed on April 14, 
1898, within a few days of the beginning of the Spanish-American War. 
After some delay a preliminary survey was made and in July, 1900, a sup-
plementary agreement was signed, increasing the sum involved. 49 This sup-
plementary agreement contained an article (the 17th) which provided that 
"the Americans cannot transfer the rights of these agreements to other na-
tions or people of other nationality." When, by the purchase of shares in 
New York, the Belgians acquired control of the American China Develop-
ment Co., the Chinese demanded the cancellation of the agreement. J. P. 
Morgan & Co. secured the control of the Company, but the Chinese in-
sisted on getting things back into their own hands and bought out all prop-
erty of whatever sort of the China Development Company in China for 
the stun of $6.75 million.50 There have been charges of bad faith in con-
nection with the acquisition of control by the Belgians. Without seeking 
to defend the interested Americans, I venture the opinion that no one can 
u Dennett, Tyler: Americans in Easter11. Asia, p. 648. 
"Texts in Rockhill, W. W., Treaties atld Conventions: Washington, 1904, pp. 252 259 . The 
agreement cancelling the concessions is in Mac:h.{urray. Treaties and Agreements: Vol. ( p. 519. 
. .. Certain bonds of the Chinese Government retained by Americans at the time played a part 
•n the IIukuang Railway Loan Agreement. 
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go through the history of the Canton-Hankow Railway Loan during these 
years without coming to the conclusion that the underlying cause of the dif-
ficulty was that capital for such foreign ventures was extremely scarce in 
the United States in 1900. If American funds had been available the Com-
pany would, in all probability, not have had its other troubles. 
This failure, and others which preceded and followed it, may be said 
to have been caused by the lack of funds seeking investment in the United 
States and by the fact that railroad and other contracts in China had a value 
and importance-for reasons connected with policies, strategy, and pres-
tige-out of proportion to their economic value. If one is to explain the 
political moves upon economic grounds, one must look for an ultimate 
rather than an immediate economic motive. The immediate cause of activity 
in the economic field seems, in this case, to have lain outside the economic 
field. 
Concerning American missionary activities in China at the beginning of 
the year 1900, we know that there were about 1,000 missionaries represent-
ing 31 societies. This is to be compared with 210 missionaries representing 
15 societies in 1875. There were about 60 American mission hospitals in 
China at the time, about half of the total number in China. It is probable 
that .nore than half of the educational institutions were American. The total 
number of "students in Christian schools" was reported in The Christian 
Occupation of China to have been 10,000 in 1889 and about 30,000 in 1905.51 
No one undertakes to give either the total value of mission property in China 
or the amount of the remittances to China for mission and philanthropic pur-
poses. We find in statements concerning the property that it must have been 
worth many millions of dollars. The American societies were awarded $570,-
983.75 in the Boxer Settlement and it is well known that only a small part 
of the total mission property was destroyed in 1900.52 If one were to guess 
at the total value of American mission property in China at the end of 1899 
he would probably put it at from $10 to $20 million. I will not venture to 
guess at the total business investment, and the American holdings of Chinese 
securities were so small as not to deserve consideration. 
By the year 1914 important changes had taken place in China, but the 
later effects of the Chinese revolution had not made themselves manifest. 
Europe was on the eve of a war which was to involve the world and alter the 
position of the foreigner in China. It will be worth while to attempt an 
estimate of American investments in China as they were at the end of 1913. 
The foreign trade of China in 1912 and 1913 was twice as great as it had 
been in 1898 and 1899. The American share of this increased trade was 
about twice what it had been at the earlier date and in the seventies. Imports 
•• The Christtan Occupation of Chi11a: Shanghai, 1922, p. 346. 'l'he estimates of 1899 are based 
upon Beach, H. P., "China as a Mission Field," Missionary Review of the World : Feb., 1899 , vol. 
12, no. 2, pp. 86·98, and table on page 93; and upon Dennis, J. S., ,.Missions in China," Rev. of 
Rev.: N. Y., Sept., 1900. 
•• Latourette, K . S., A History of Christian Missions in Chi,.a: N. Y ., 1929, p. 253. 'l'he amount 
awarded was more than half again as large as the claims of the societies. 
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from the United States were now usually about equal to exports. This in-
crease in the relative importance of imports probably meant increasing Ameri-
can business investments in China. 
The number of Americans in China continued to grow, as did the number 
of American firms. The customs statistics give the number of American 
firms as 131 in 1913 and the number of Americans as 5,340. For 1914 the 
figures were 136 and 4,365. It is when we turn to the percentage these figures 
formed of the totals, that we encounter an important difference from the 
situation in 1900. In 1899 Americans formed 13.6% of the foreigners in 
China and in 1913 no more than 3.2%; American firms were 7% of the total 
foreign firms in 1899 and only 3.4% in 1913. The chief reason was a great 
increase in the Japanese and Russian population in China and in the numbers 
of Japanese and Russian firms. There had been no important change in the 
American position in relation to the interests of the Western European 
nations. American shipping in 1912 and 1913 was still no more than about 
1% of the total reported by the Chinese customs. 
An examination of the available statistics shows that the missionary and 
philanthropic activity of American societies increased as rapidly or perhaps 
more rapidly than did business activity. American missionaries in China 
numbered about 2,500 in 1914, about 40% of the total American popula-
tion. 53 For the years now under consideration we have somewhat more in-
formation than for 1899, but comparison is difficult. The number of mis-
sionaries was two and one-half times that in 1900. The number of hospitals 
supported by Americans had increased from about 60 to 200. The number 
of schools maintained by Americans was probably three times the number in 
1900. An estimate of the value of the plant and equipment of five important 
American institutions of higher education for 1914 put the total at $1.5 
million. 54 The property of the American Y. M. C. A. was reported at about 
the same time to have been $1 million.55 It is estimated that American mis-
sion societies were remitting to China at the rate of about $3.5 million in 
1916, and that four important American societies remitted $1.8 million in 
1917 or 1918.56 If later figures may be accepted, the value of mission prop-
erty may be estimated at about eight times the annual remittance, and this 
would give us $28 million as the total value of mission property. Some such 
figure may be held reasonable on other grounds as well. So we come to an 
estimate of about $25 million for the 1914 value of the property of American 
mission and philanthropic societies in China . 
. 1 
011 Estimates of 2,309 for 1915 and 2,858 for 1916 are to be found in Arnold, Julean Comtller-
eta. Ha>Jdbooll of Chi1ta: Washington, 1919, val. I, p. 423, and vol. II, p. 288. In the 'references 
wlach follow, the two editions of this book will be distinguished by giving the date in each case . 
.. Commercial Handbook of China: 1919, val. II, p. 429 . 
.. Commercial Handbook of Clti"a: 1919, vol. I, p. 288. 
1 ; Clti1ta Mission Year Booll: 1919, p. 297. Commercial Handbooll of China: 1919, vol. I p. 287·· ~~: h' p. 423. 'l' he last ref_erenc~ is . to ~n estimate _by Dr. Frank Rawlinson of $3.572,780 for 1916 
6 • •c . was ~ased upon an mvest1gattOn 10 Shangha1. See also Sammons, Thomas. "American Mis· IZ0~~ 1 ~n Chma," Mil/ards Review (later Chit~a Weekly Review), July 7, 1917, val. I, no. 5, Pi>-
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It is impossible with our present information to make an estimate of 
American business investments for 1913 which can be defended. It has been 
pointed out that there were some 130 American firms in China and that the 
American population was over 5,000. American trade with China amounted 
in 1913 to Hk. Tls. 73 million, according to Chinese statistics, and to $65 
million, according to American statistics. Trade with the United States 
formed 7.6% of China's total trade in 1913. It had risen in 1905 to 15%, 
but this rise was connected with the Russo-Japanese War. The trade in 
kerosene doubled between 1899 and 1913 and the American share of this 
doubled trade had increased. 
The foreign population of Shanghai in 1910 was 13,436, and the Ameri-
can population 940; for 1915 the figures were 18,519 and 1,307.57 There 
was now an American bank in China, the International Banking Corporation, 
with a branch at Shanghai and four other branches in the country. When 
this bank was taken over by the National City Bank of New York in 191658 
it had capital, surplus, and undivided profits of about $8 million, but it must 
be borne in mind that it had branches in Europe and South America, as well 
as in the Far East. 59 American banks had suffered certain disabilities before 
the passage of the Federal Reserve Act and certain supplementary acts. An 
An,erican Chamber of Commerce was formed in 1915 with a membership 
of 32 firms. 60 Such evidence may be multiplied, but it cannot be more than 
the most unsatisfactory indicator of the extent of American business invest-
ments. One is inclined to the opinion that they cannot have been much less 
than the value of the property of the mission societies. 
American holdings of Chinese Government securities may be estimated 
with fair accuracy. The period from 1900 to 1913 saw many ventures in 
which Americans were interested, come to nothing. The Canton-Hankow 
concession has been dealt with. Other plans which would have involved 
American capital if they had been successful were associated with Manchuria. 
The reasons for American interest in Manchuria probably are not easy to 
find on the simple theory that capital follows trade or on the theory which 
has sometimes been advanced that capital follows the missionary. No Ameri-
can interest actually in China serves to explain the Manchurian proposals. It 
is probable that American attention to Russian ambitions in this region at 
an earlier time brought Manchuria to the attention of Americans, and that the 
continued centering of international political attention upon Manchuria 
served to keep it there. Political interest, which involved ultimate economic 
interest, probably was behind the financial proposals. 
The first American proposal may well be cited as an exception to my gen-
57 Chi11a Year B ook: 1914, p. 658. China Year Book: 1916, p. 617. 
M Lee, Frederic C., Currcnc)', Banking, and Finance in China: Washington, 1926, p. 94. 
611 Bennett, R. C., uAmerican Banks taking their Place in China," China Weekly Revietv Sut-
plemc11t: June 30, 1923, p. 10. America's First Foreign Banking Venture, Millards (late r Chin!J 
Weekly Rcvietu): March 23, 1918, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 110, 111. 
00 
"Annual Report of the President." Millards (later China Weekly Review): June 19, 1920, 
vol. 13, no. 3, p. 119. 
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eralization. It was Harriman's plan for a round-the-world transportation 
system. It was probably a business venture of an American sort, made at a 
time when American business methods were less popular abroad than they 
have become. One may suppose a continental observer saying of this and 
Secretary Knox's plan that they were attempts at "rationalization" under un-
favorable circumstances. The failure of Mr. Harriman's plans and the am-
bitions of Willard Straight brought about the attempt to put through a joint 
British-American project for a railroad from Hsi1m1intun to Aigun. The 
British contract for the line from Hsinmintun to Fakumen was signed in 
1907, but the Japanese prevented its being carried out, relying upon certain 
secret protocols attached to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of December, 1905.61 
The wider issues involved can not be dealt with here, and the informed reader 
will have reflected upon them. 
The Knox plan 62 for the rationalization of the Manchurian railways and 
the Chin Chow-aigun proposal 62 met with the opposition of Japan and Russia. 
It is probable that political considerations and the economic interests of both 
powers, whether the economic interests were real or not, explain the failure of 
these projects. It would not have been easy to finance large projects in the 
United States, but there would no doubt have been sufficient funds for any 
of these proposals. We may conclude that these projects differ from the 
early Canton-Hankow project in that the motive for them and their failure 
is not to be found in the lack of investment funds in America, but in the in-
ternational political situation in the Far East. And, it may be added, the 
situation in the Far East was thought of in terms of the politics of Europe. 
The Manchurian efforts of the United States and the keen interest of the 
Taft administration led to American entrance into the three power group 
which undertook to finance the Hukuang Railways. These comprised the 
Hunan section of the Canton-Hankow and the Hupeh section of the Han-
kow-Ichang Railway. President Taft added a touch of the spectacular to the 
negotiations by a personal telegram to the Chinese ruler in which he re-
quested "equal participation by American capital in the present railway 
loan." 03 This was arranged and the Four Power group-the Old Consortium 
--<:arne into existence. The Hukuang Railways loan contract was signed on 
May 20, 1911,64 The American interest in Manchuria had continued and the 
American banks had signed a preliminary agreement for a currency reform 
and industrial development loan on October 27, 1910.65 This agreement was 
turned over to the Consortium. Since Manchuria was involved the Japanese 
and the Russians were interested and they made successful efforts to enter 
~onsortium.66 Since Japan and Russia were both capital importing 
b k" ~Villoughby, W. W., Foreign Rights and Interests in China: Baltimore, 1920, pp. 312· 14. Horn-
/c I' : K., Contemporary Politics in the Far East: N. Y., 1916, pp. 259·60. The whole chapter 
ea s .. Wlth the proposals under discussion. 
F '·RBoth dealt with in Secretary Knox's letter of Nov., 1909, to. the British Government. U. S. 
or. elatrons: 1910, p. 234. 
1920 .. The telegram is reprinted in Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in Chi,.a: Baltimore, • p. 551. 
: MMacMurray, Treaties and Agreements: vol. I, p. 866. 
11 acMurray, Treaties and Agreements: vol. I, p. 851. Agreement of June 18, 1912. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreeme11ts: vol. II, p. 1021. 
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nations, one is led to reflect upon the nature and the functions of the Con-
sortium. 
This Six Power group soon entered into negotiations for the Reorganiza-
tion Loan, 67 but a change of administration in the United States brought about 
the withdrawal of the American banks before the loan contract was signed. 
In a statement given to the press in explanation of President Taft's tele-
gram, the Secretary of State had given as one reason for American insist-
ence the fact that the Hukuang Railways loan was different from earlier 
loans. It involved the general revenues of the Central Government of China 
and earlier loans had not. It was desirable for the United States to partici-
pate, for important questions might arise as the result of the nature of the 
pledge. ss In the reply of the American Government to the request of the 
American group of bankers for support, dated March 18, 1913, we are told 
that one reason for the withdrawal of such support lies in the fact that cer-
tain Chinese revenues are pledged. These revenues rest upon taxes which are 
to be administered by foreign agents and the conditions of the loan "touch 
very nearly the administrative independence of China."69 Here we have 
neatly illustrated a dilemma which has confronted America throughout the 
history of her relations with China. Will American policy be forwarded best 
by cooperation, by insisting upon cooperation, if necessary, or by independent 
action, by refusal to cooperate upon occasion? This has been erected by some 
into a choice of policies. It is, rather, a choice of methods and no general rule 
is possible. The opposition in a modern government, to use an analogy, can-
not determine in advance whether it will compromise or fight. It depends. 
The Reorganization Loan of 1913 carried provision for the repayment of 
advances made by the Six Power Group while the loan was under negotia-
tion and for the repayment of certain provincial loans. This disposed of any 
American holding of government obligations to April, 1913. The Americans 
had taken part in a loan of Shanghai Tis. 3,500,000 to the Shanghai Taotai 
in 1910 and in the Hupei Provincial Loan of 1911 for Hankow Tis. 2,000,-
000.70 The repayment of outstanding obligations left them, so far as the 
records show, with only the American share of the Hukuang Railways loan 
outstanding. We may be fairly certain that no new loans were made during 
the remaining months of 1913, for, as a Chinese student of the subject re-
marks, American finance in China reached "a period of total stagnation" 
with the withdrawal of government support.71 
The American holdings of Chinese securities may be arrived at by setting 
down the American share in the Hukuang Railways loan. There may have 
"Contract signed by the Five Power group in April, 1913. Text in MacMurray, Treat ies and 
Agreements: vol. II, p. 1007 . 
.. ". 'he statement is reprinted in Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China: ed. of 1920, 
pp. 551-2. 
68 Text in MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements: vol. II, p. 1025. 
"MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements: vol. I. pp. 805 and 902. 
11 Tan, S. H., The Diplomacy of American Investments in China. This is an unpublished dis-
sertation of 1927 in the Library of the University of Chicago. My references to it are few because 
it is not generally available. It ouiht to be published. 
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been American holdings of earlier securities floated in Europe, but I am in-
formed by American bankers that they were few before the end of the war 
in 1918. The Hukuang loan was for £6,000,000. The rate of interest was 
5%. It was shared equally among the interested countries and the redemption 
of the loan was to begin in 1922. The amount outstanding was $7,299,000, 
on January 1, 1914. 
Any recapitulation serves to commit me to a more definite statement than 
I care to make. If I were obliged to estimate American investments in China 
as of January 1, 1914, I should offer the following figures with the under-
standing that they may be drastically revised as a result of further investiga-
tion: Business investments, $25 million; American holdings of Chinese 
securities, $7,299,000; property of mission and philanthropic societies, $25 
million. The total I would put between $50 and $60 million. 
The final period to be considered is that since the European War. It may 
be called the present if the term can be stretched to cover the years since 
1925, for much of the detailed information goes back to that year. The lack 
of late information is less damaging to the present value of the study since 
it is the general opinion that very few foreign loans have been negotiated by 
the government now in power in China. 
The European war brought a remarkable increase in American trade 
with China and in other American interests in that country. This was fol-
lowed by a sharp decline in 1921. More recently there has been steady 
growth at a higher level than before the war. Between 1913 and 1927 the 
trade of China more than doubled and the American share in that trade 
doubled also. This is borne out by the American statistics which show an in-
crease from $54 million in 1912 and $65 million in 1913 to $263 million and 
$245 million in 1926 and 1927. The only available figures for 1928 show a 
total trade for the United States with China, Hongkong, and Kwantung of 
$321.8 million. 7 2 A characteristic of American trade with China during this 
period was a return to the import-export relation of the 19th century. China's 
exports to the United States exceeded her imports from the United States 
until 1928. The percentage of China's trade which was with the United 
States was 17% in 1926, and 15% in 1927. 
A similar change is recorded in the field of shipping. From the eighties 
~ntil 1918 American shipping was regularly 1% or less of the total shipping 
m the Chinese trade. In 1920 it reached 5%, and in 1927 it was just under 
5% . There was in 1928 an American company with steamers on the upper 
yangt_ze, and the Standard Oil Company is reported to have had 12 boats 
111 Chmese waters. 73 That the increase in American tonnage on the Pacific 
was the result of American activities during the war needs no comment. 
The number of American firms in China is reported by the customs to 
-
F b 72 Mann, Lawrence B., "Geographic Distribution of Foreign Trade in 1928," Commerce Reports: 
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have been 551 in 1927, and the American population in China to have been 
6,970. The year 1925 is perhaps a better one to judge by since many Ameri-
can residents were away during 1927. In 1925 the customs statistics report 
482 American firms and 9,844 residents. American firms were 6.2% of all 
foreign firms in 1925, and 7.3 % in 1927. The percentage which the Ameri-
can population formed of the total was 2.9 in 1925, and 2.3 in 1927. The 
percentage of American firms was again what it had been in 1899, but the 
great Russian and Japanese population of Manchuria kept the population 
percentage low. 
The American authorities give figures which are somewhat larger. The 
1926 edition of the C01nmercial and Industrial Handbook gives 12,530 as 
the population and 617 as the number of firms. A list of American firms in 
China compiled by the Department of Commerce in August, 1928, includes 
660 firms. About SO% of these firms were in Shanghai where American bus-
iness has had its center since the middle of the last century, and the number 
in Manchuria was about 10%. 
The American missionary population in China was about half the total 
American population before 1927, that is, 6,000 missionaries in a total 
American population of 12,000. This is to be compared with 1,000 mission-
aries in 1900, and 2,500 in 1914. One of the results of the war was to in-
crease the number of American Catholic missionaries. In 1908 a Franciscan 
priest reported that "he knew of only seven American Catholic missionaries 
in the Empire."74 The latest estimate is 269 for a recent year. 75 The num-
ber of hospitals in China supported by American Protestant societies was 
152 in 1919 and the number of schools so supported may be indicated by 
stating that there were 193 middle schools for boys.76 
It is not necessary to enumerate schools and hospitals for this recent 
period, for we have estimates of the value of mission property and of remit-
tances to China for the work of philanthropic societies. The work of prep-
aration for the Washington Conference included the drawing-up of an 
estimate of the amount annually expended for philanthropic and educational 
work in the Far East. The amount so remitted by the leading societies for 
the latest year for which statistics were available was $7,345,597.77 Another 
estimate by A. L. Warnshuis, published in 1927, puts the annual expendi-
ture of "American Missionary Agencies" at "not less than $10 million."7 S 
These totals, I believe, take into account the expenditures in China of the 
Rockefeller Foundation. It is not so certain that they take into account the 
increased contributions of American Catholics, but I can find no separate 
estimates of the amount of such contributions that went to China. The 
,. Latourette, History of Christian Missions in Clti11a: p. 540. 
1~ Goodrich, C., "American Catholic Missions in China," Cit. Soc. & Pol. Sc. Rev.: vol. XI, 
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"Christian Ocmpation of Chi11a: pp. 346-7. 
"Patton , C. H., The Business of Missions: N. Y., 1924, p. 192. 
18 Warnshuis, A. I.,., "Christian Missions and the Situation in China," A1mals of tire A mer. 
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American Red Cross has at times spent considerable sums in China, but dur-
ing the past few years the amount has been small.70 The available estimates 
put the remittances to China of American mission and philanthropic societies 
at about $10 million a year. 
The total value of the property in China of these societies has been esti-
mated also. One estimate which I believe to have been made some years ago 
by A. L. Warnshuis is that "the capital invested in schools, colleges, hos-
pitals, churches, houses, and lands is . . . approximately $80 million."80 This 
must be compared with the estimate of the State Department. This estimate 
gives the total for reports received to October, 1928, as $52,109,073 for 
philanthropic and mission investments. It is probable that the estimate of the 
State Department is more carefully made and that the higher value of silver 
at an earlier time helps to explain the $80 million estimate. In any case, we 
have the two estimates of $50 million and $80 million. 
When we turn to the estimates of business investments we find differ-
ences which are more difficult to explain. We have every reason to suppose 
that American business investments were several times as large in 1928 as 
in 1914. The trade statistics, the number of firms, and the amount of Ameri-
can shipping have already been dealt with. The number of American bank-
ing corporations doing business in China is four. 81 The effect of the war is 
illustrated by Lee's comment that when he began his investigation there were 
seven and that the number had since been reduced to four.8 2 The China 
Trade Act has provided for the federal incorporation of American com-
panies doing business in China.8s American chambers of commerce exist in 
seven of the open ports of China and there is a central organization known 
as the Associated American Chambers of Commerce in China which was 
created at Shanghai, October 23, 1922.84 Americans are the owners of in-
dustrial plants and office buildings in Shanghai and Tientsin and of such 
institutions as the American school at Shanghai. 
The total value of such business investments was estimated for about 
1924 by Lee, who had spent "the major portion of the years 1921 and 
1922"85 in China. "The investment of American firms operating in China in 
lands, buildings, and other equipment, other than stocks on hand, is ex-
tremely difficult to estimate. The known investments of the larger firms 
amount to $20 million gold. A conservative estimate of the total of such 
holdings would therefore be around $30 million gold."86 
~e estimate of the State Department is not to be compared with Lee's 
b th" Ball, Ray, Tire Bala>~ce of Int. Payments of the U. S. in 1928, p. 35, states payments abroad 
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estimate without making allowance for the fact that it does include the value 
of stocks of goods on hand. Otherwise, I believe, the two cover the same 
field and may be regarded as estimates of the property in China owned by 
Americans. The State Department's estimate for "Business Investments" is 
$95,352,836 and I shall refer to it as "the $100 million estimate." 
It is probable that Lee would have added a sum equal to his estimate if 
he had been asked to estimate the value of the stocks of goods on hand and 
in the possession of American firms in China. The difference must be at-
tributed to his unwillingness, which is quite understandable, to make a rash 
estimate. If we accept the estimate of the State Department as representing 
the facts, do we then have a satisfactory estimate? The answer to this 
question depends in part upon one's interpretation of the term "investment." 
It seems to me a defensible point of view to accept as international in-
vestments all movements of funds from one country to another which are 
the result of differences in rates of return on capital and which in turn cause, 
in the present or future, movements of funds in the opposite direction. The 
valuation of such investments may be in terms of the original movement of 
funds or in terms of the later and opposite movement of funds. This means 
that American investments may be valued according to the payments which 
were made to bring them into existence or they may be valued according to 
the return they bring to their American owners. It seems to me more reason-
able to value them in terms of the return they bring. This means a capitaliza-
tion of the net income of American business investments in China. In the 
language of the business man it means taking into account good will. 
The estimate of the State Department is a valuation of American physical 
property in China, which did not take into account good will or return to the 
investor. A recent transaction gives us some information concerning 
good will. 
The newspapers have reported recently the purchase by American in-
terests of the plant of the Electricity Department of the Shanghai Municipal 
Council. The price to be paid is Shanghai Tls. 81 million or about $50 
million. When these payments have been made there will have been added 
to American business investments in China, by this one transaction, a con-
siderable fraction of the earlier business investments. This must be recorded 
here, although it comes later than our most recent estimate. 
The bid of the American and Foreign Power Co. was commented upon 
in the press of Shanghai during the past few months and it has been said that 
it was from two to three times the value placed upon the physical plant of 
the Electricity Department. It is plain from this that physical valuation 
alone does not represent the investment in this case. I will not attempt to 
apply this ratio to the estimate we have of the value of American business 
property. 
We may leave the subject of business investments with the general state-
ment that the latest estimate available puts the direct investments under this 
heading at about $100 million. 
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Certain agreements which have been abandoned would have brought into 
existence investments difficult to classify. They would have involved busi-
ness investments, but in such terms as might at any time have involved the 
Chinese Government. The agreement between the Chinese Government and 
the Standard Oil Company for the exploitation and operation of oil fields 
in certain provinces is an example. 87 It would have brought into existence 
a corporation whose stock was held by the Standard Oil Company and the 
Chinese Government. A similar contract is that between Henry Hussey, act-
ing on behalf of an American syndicate, and the Chinese Government. 88 
We come next to American holdings of Chinese securities and the obliga-
tions of the Chinese Government to Americans.8 9 To arrive at a total I have 
accepted the information given in various published lists which may be gen-
erally accepted as reliable. It is possible that a student who had been in 
close touch with the financial transactions of the Chinese Government during 
the past year, some one in the Ministry of Finance, or someone on the 
Kemmerer Commission which has been in China since January, 1929, could 
make corrections. I assume that the present Chinese Government has not 
attempted to select certain unsecured obligations for payment, but will await 
the results of a complete study. One would suppose this from the way in 
which the subject was dealt with at the Chinese National Economic and 
Financial Conferences held in Shanghai in 1928,90 and from the fact that 
foreign debts are among the subjects to be dealt with by the Kemmerer 
Commission. I assume also that few new foreign obligations have been un-
dertaken by the present government. This seems the more reasonable when 
it is understood how rapidly the internal obligations of the Chinese Govern-
ment have grown in recent years. It is estimated that on July 1, 1928, the 
outstanding internal loans of the "Peking" Government amounted to $208 
million, Chinese currency, while outstanding internal loans of the "Nanking" 
Government were no less than $301 million.91 It seems evident from this 
that the chief reliance of the present government has been upon borrowing 
within China. 
For the secured loans we have a recently published list by E. Kann and 
J. Baylin, which Mr. Kann of Shanghai has kindly made available. For un-
secured loans and other obligations I have accepted the lists as published in 
the China Year Book, 1928. There are two lists; one showing obligations 
according to the Chinese Financial Readjustment Commission ( 1927) and 
87 MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements: vol. II, p. 1109. (See note cancelling the agreement 
and creating obligation of the Chinese Government for the payment of $543,703.89 on p. 1111.) 
88 Printed as Annex XII to List of Cotltracts of American Nationals Submitted 11nder Resolr<tio" 
XI of the Conference o" the Limitation of Armament: Washington, 1925. A similar plan may have 
been behind a venture of the Orient Mines Company which is listed by Eldridge, F. R., Trading 
Wlt/• Asia: New York, 1921, p. 399. 
89 Negotiations which did not resu lt in loans have in most cases not been mentioned, even when 
their political importance is great, as in the case of the formation of the new Consortium in 1918. 
'"I am informed that the Chinese Government expects to publish English translations of the 
Proceedings of their conferences shortly. Mr. K. K. Liu, a student at the University of Michigan, 
has been kind enough to go over the Chinese text with me. 
91 Commerce Reports: August 5, 1929, p. 325. The figures, we are told, were "compiled by a 
large American financial concern." 
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the foreign delegations to the Tariff Conference of 1926; the other showing 
the obligations of the Ministry of Communications. 
The results of the study of these lists of obligations is shown below: 
Date of 
Issue Mat'y 
-- -
1911 1951 
1919 1921 
1919 1921 
AMERICAN LOANS TO CHINA 
I. SECURED LoANS AS oF ]AN. 1, 1929 
Denomlnatlon of % Countries Involved American 
Loan Agency 
Hukuang Railways 5 England, France, The American 
Germany, U. S. Group 
Republic of China 6 United States Continental & 
Treasury Notes of Commercial 
1919 Tr. & Sav. 
Bk. of Chicago 
Republic of China 6 United States Pacific Devel-
Gold Notes of 1919 opment Corp. 
TOTAL 
II. UNSECURED LOANS AS OF DEc. 31, 1925 
Washington Banks for Educational Expenses ............................. . 
Munsey Trust Co., Educational Expenses ..................................... . 
Amer. Share 
Outstanding 
ln u.s.$ 
$ 7,512,670 
8,261,760 
8,497,500 
$24,271,930 
U.S.$ · 
67,555.00 
20,000.00 
Grand Canal Improvement Loan ..................................................... . 1,242,956.96 
American International Corporation 
Chuchow-Chingchow Railway ...................................................... .. 1,630,209.56 
Siems and Carey 
TOTAL $2,960,721.52 
III. OBLIGATIONS TO AMERICAN FIRMS, AS OF DEC. 31, 1925 
LIST oF DELEGATION To TARIFF CoNFERENCE AND FINANCIAL 
READJUSTMENT CoMMISSION U. S. $ 
American Trading Co., (Shanghai Mint) ..................................... lS 702,349.22 
63,258.80 
American Trading Co. (Hankow Paper Mill).............................. 3,568.68 
Wah Chang Trading Corporation (Shanghai Mint) ..................... S 203,548.34 l 17,601.70 
Hsin Fou Co. (Shanghai Mint)........................................................ 29,163.50 
Anderson, Meyer & Co. (Hankow Paper Mill).............................. 1,953.98 
American Metal Co. (Canton Mint)................................................ 676,247.91 
American Trading Co. (Anking Mint) ............................................ 186,376.97 
American Trading Co. (Lungyen Iron Mining Co.) ................... S 72,927.43 l 3,649.83 
America Trading Co. (Bureau of Engraving)............................ 16,204.69 
Anderson Meyer & Co. (Ministry of War).................................. 8,298.10 
Anderson Meyer & Co. (Aeronautical Dept.)................................ 3,051.14 
Ault & Wiborg (Bureau of Engraving) ....................................... S 22,774.06 l 21,489.04 
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E. W. Frazar (Ministry of War) ....................................... ............ . 3,046.74 
60,000.00 
30,000.00 
9,448.34 
Pacific Development Corporation (Hunan Mining Bureau) ....... . 
T. M. Wilkinson Co. (Wharves at Foochow) ·- -- ----------------------------
Curtis Aeroplane & Motor Co. (Training of Naval Cadets) ....... . 
Subtotal 2,134,958.47 
List of Ministry of Communications : $ Chinese Currency 
Baldwin Locomotive Works ---------·---- ------------ -- ---- ·····-···· ··------- ----- 3,843,084.76 
W. W. Fowler ----- ------------------------- ---- ·------- ··--·- -· -·· -·---·- -- ·-- ---·-·--·---- 2,305,584.64 
American Locomotive Co. ---- --- -- --------- ---- -----·- --- -- ·--- ---- ------ ---------- 3,189,320.90 
Steel Products Corporation ---- -·---···----------··-- -- -------·-··-----· ·------ -- ---- 1,590,574.00 
W. W . Fowler Co·---------- ----· -------------------------·--- -- ---------------------------- 4,077,812.06 
W. W. Fowler Co .... .. --------· --· -- -- --- --·---- -- -··----------------- ----- ·------·--- --- 900,493.14 
Anderson, Meyer & Co....... .... ...... ................. ................ ............. 171,698.68 
American Trading Co. -- --·····----·--·-- --------·-·· ····· ··· ········--·-----·-- -------- 37,210.03 
Anderson, Meyer & Co. (Telegraph) -------- ··---- ---------- ·--------- -- ---- 54,613.08 
Chinese $ 16,170,391.29 
Subtotal U. S. $ 8,085,195.65 
TOTAL U.S.$ 10,220,154.12 
IV. AMERICAN PuRCHASES oF CHINESE SEcURITIEs IN EuRoPE 
EsTIMATE oF FREDERic LEE 
Chinese Government Reorganization Loan: 
Russian Series ---- --- --·----·----- ----- --- -------- -- -------- -------------- ----- --·--------$ 2,500,000.00 
Paris and London Series.·------------------------- ------ --------- ---------- ------ 250,000.00 
Chinese Imperial Government Gold Loan of 1895..... .... ........... 2,000,000.00 
Other Issues (Estimated)--------·---- ----- ·-----·------------------ ---------------- --- 4,250,000.00 
Total $ 9,000,000.00 
V. REcENT LoANS (UNVERIFIED, NoT IN GRAND ToTAL): 
Radio Corporation of America .. ·--------------------------------·------------------$ 170,000.00 
(New York Ti,mes, Nov. 7, Dec. 25, 1928) 
GRAND TOTAL (omitting V.) $46,452,805.64 
The reader is asked to consider the larger and the smaller of two totals 
of American investments for 1929 which may be arrived at from the figures 
presented. Taking the value of the property of American mission and phil-
anthropic societies at $52 million, business investments at $30 million, and 
American holdings of Chinese securities and the obligations of the Chinese 
Government at $46 million, we arrive at an estimate of $128 million. Taking 
the first at $80 million, the second at $100 million, and the third at $46 
38 AMERICAN INVESTMENTS 
million, we arrive at an estimate of $226 million. If now we eliminate the 
property of mission and philanthropic societies on the ground that they are 
not investments in the proper sense of the word, we may put the estimate of 
American investments in China, from available information, at $146 million. 
Certain conclusions and generalizations are offered, based upon the ac-
count of American investments in the preceding pages. These conclusions 
are numbered for convenience in referring to them and not because I suppose 
they can be withdrawn from the context or considered independently of 
each other. 
1. Throughout the hundred years ending in 1928 direct American busi-
ness investments in China have been greater than any other form of Ameri-
can investment. The opinion may be ventured, from what we know of Ameri-
can foreign investments before 1914 and from the history of foreign invest-
ments in China, that direct business investments are an early stage in in-
ternational capital movements. 
2. Americans were late in entering the field of loans to the Chinese Gov-
ernment and in this field they have not been either important or successful. 
A certain immaturity is revealed in the relation of the Americans to the old 
Consortium and in the relation of the bankers to the State . Department. 
Government initiative is not characteristic of American economic activity in 
fields where the American business man is at home. 
3. The geographical distribution of American business investments is 
such as to put the center at Shanghai. American holdings of mission prop-
erty are relatively greater in the southern part of China. American interest 
in loans to the Chinese government has frequently centered attention upon 
Manchuria. The explanation is, probably, that business investments have fol-
lowed trade; that mission activities have been maintained where they got an 
early start; and that loans to the Chinese Government have been the result 
of the international political situation in the Far East. 
4. The amount and distribution of American investment in China is, 
largely, the result of the position of the foreigner in China in the past and 
of America's pre-war place in the field of international finance. Significant 
changes in both these respects have taken place and are taking place. We do 
not yet know what consequences will follow. 
I turn for a moment to wider considerations than those touching Ameri-
can investments only. Looking upon the flow of capital to China, one must 
admit that it has not been great. The general reason I have stated to be the 
passive resistance offered by the social, economic, and political organization 
of Chin::t. To this must be added the international rivalries of the foreign 
powers and the position of the foreigner in China. Investment has taken 
two forms and the barriers to the free flow of capital may be observed in 
each case. In the case of loans to the government, the barriers were the very 
nature of the government and the jealous quarrels among the foreign powers. 
The foreigners, one may say, brought to bear the psychology of the entering 
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wedge. In the case of direct business investments the barriers have been the 
relations which brought into existence the system of treaty ports and extra-
territoriality and, behind these relations, the nature of the economic and 
social organization of China. 
Foreign investments in China have had political importance beyond their 
economic importance, because the Chinese Government has, of necessity, been 
involved, because foreigners and foreign business establishments ar'e concen-
trated in the treaty ports, and because the general result of foreign trade, 
foreign investment and modern equipment in transportation and industry 
have brought about the disintegration of traditional China. 
One is tempted to say that if capital is to flow to China in considerable 
quantities, a new means of getting it there must be worked out. It is difficult 
to imagine that the capital for a great railway system could ever be intro-
duced into China by the methods which have prevailed in the loan negotia-
tions in the past. It is difficult to imagine that the capital for great industrial 
development in China could be brought to China by direct private invest-
ments of foreigners in the open ports of the country. It does not follow 
from this that international agreement concerning China and a changed posi-
tion of the foreigner in China will make a fundamental difference. I believe 
it to be generally true that the flow of capital from developed countries to 
an undeveloped country is in accordance with the principle of capacity to 
receive. The fundamental change will be in China's capacity to receive. 
